the ICR and the IMP. shall develop a process to provide a transition plan for hand -over of. IMP security responsibilities overtime. The IMP. Ahtisarijev plan je dinamit za ceo svet! # AM – 28 Mar. Međutim, na kraju EU je ključ. Ahtisarijev plan predviđa slanje specijalnog predstavnika sa velikim brojem članova osoblja da koordinira civilno.

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Retrieved from ” https: Rejection of the Belgrade-Pristina deal comes from a bedrock patriotism that is common to most populations who see state borders shift against their will.

But ahtiswrijev do not know how to fight Belgrade.

Sukob Srba i KPS-a na protestima

Review our privacy policy for more details. Martti Ahtisaari stated, on 8 Februarythat after a period of consultations with the parties, he would finalize his Settlement proposal for submission to the UN Security Council, when he would also elaborate on the status issue itself. This is the first high level agreement between the two states, and shows that Serbia can deal with Kosovo as an equal.

The cost, however, is steep. Archived from the original PDF on 22 October It is a kind of de facto recognition of Kosovo and that may be its greatest long-term significance.

After this period of consultations and further modification of the Settlement, Ahtisaari convened a high-level meeting of the parties in Vienna on March Given the near-total absence of law enforcement, the area is surprisingly peaceful; since Kosovo declared independence in there have been only four fatalities in the North linked to the dispute.

If the North is firmly opposed, there is a risk of violence against the organisers, and polls that require hefty KFOR protection would be of little use. Implementing the agreement will require both countries to amend the relevant legislation.

The issues will have to be aired in public, members of parliament will have to take stands. Most of the other points are as diaphanous as this one, amenable to different readings and needing a lot of follow-up work to give them life. The first is that the Serbian government has given up on keeping northern Kosovo in its system and has ceded its authority to Pristina.


Both capitals should make improving their bilateral ties the priority, and should not allow lingering disagreements over northern Kosovo to impede them. They should take the time necessary to prepare the ground.

This page was plab edited on 30 Decemberat Better state-to-state relations are much more important than administrative details governing the North. For example, it would give Kosovo the right to apply for membership in international organizations, create a Kosovo Security Force and adopt national symbols. There are only two sure things about the agreement, both are very important, and neither is spelled out anywhere in its text.

On 21 February, Ahtisaari began a period of consultations with the parties in Vienna to finalize the Settlement.

Yet the thaw in Belgrade-Pristina relations is still fragile and easy to reverse. Time for a Modest Ahtisarjjev These should be protected.

So far there ahtisarijsv been no surge in violence against Kosovo institutions in the North but that is a risk in the near future, with the North Mitrovica Administrative Atisarijev and its staff being the most obvious targets. Dual Sovereignty in Practice. Download pdf to continue reading the full report. The Path to Normalistion.

The United States called the proposal “fair and balanced,” [15] while the EU Presidency noted that Ahtisaari’s proposals “build on almost twelve months of direct talks between Belgrade and Pristina. Belgrade and Pristina need to explain, in detail, what the agreement means for northern Kosovo.

Ahtisaarijev plan i sever Kosova

This community has a bad reputation these days; they are portrayed as extremists, criminals, or at best simply too few in ahtisrijev to matter. The 19 April agreement between Kosovo and Serbia is an earthquake in Balkan politics: Northerners can easily boycott or sabotage all of those measures and probably remain confident that Pristina would stick to its positions.


Hide Footnote with a large arsenal ranging from community pressure and civil disobedience to organised boycotts, intimidation and occasional pitched battles. This site uses cookies. The differences are in emphasis and symbolism, emotionally powerful but with modest practical implications. It is too soon to try pkan say what it all means. One ironic component of this story is that Serbia will probably be tacitly encouraged to violate its own laws by the EU to make all this work, as ahtisraijev it properly — amending all the relevant legislation and regulation — would take much longer than Brussels prefers.

Sukob Srba i KPS-a na protestima – Bnet

Ahisarijev two governments should paln the transfer of all security sector staff in Kosovo from Belgrade payroll and jurisdiction to Pristina, which entails: Consider the second point:.

In Pristina, Kosovo Albanian leaders issued a statement after meeting with Ahtisaari saying they are “convinced that the international process for the resolution of Kosovo’s status led by President Ahtisaari will be concluded soon with Kosovo becoming an independent state.

Hide Footnote The dual name is another sign of trouble ahead: Curiously, all three courses lead toward the same place: Much of the agreement depends on the cooperation of the northern Kosovo Serbs and their leaders, all of whom reject the deal and promise to resist. Or it can strike out on its own without any formal declarations, subverting and obstructing the agreement where it can and hoping ahtidarijev a re-negotiation.

These are tectonic shifts, whose effects will be felt no matter what happens with the early attempts to implement the deal. One or both may have to amend their constitutions.